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Income differences across countries primarily reflect differences in total factor productivity (TFP).
More disaggregated data show that the TFP gap between rich and poor countries varies systematically
across industrial sectors of the economy: Poor countries are particularly unproductive in tradable and
investment goods sectors. In this paper, we develop a quantitatively-oriented framework to explain
such cross-country patterns in aggregate and sectoral TFP. We start by documenting that an important
distinction between sectors is their average establishment size. For example, establishments in tradable
and investment goods sectors operate at much larger scales than those in the non-tradable sector. In
our model, sectors with larger scales of operation have more financing needs, and are hence disproportionately
affected by financial frictions. Our quantitative exercises show that financial frictions account for a
substantial part of the observed cross-country patterns in TFP, both at the aggregate and at the sectoral
level. Our model also has novel implications for the impact of financial frictions on the relative scale
between the tradable and the non-tradable sectors, which are shown to be consistent with the data.
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Income per capita diﬀerences across countries are primarily accounted for by low total factor
productivity (TFP) in poor countries (Klenow and Rodr´ ıguez-Clare, 1997; Hall and Jones,
1999). More disaggregated data show that the TFP gap between rich and poor countries
varies systematically across industrial sectors of the economy. For instance, poor coun-
tries are particularly unproductive in producing tradables and investment goods (Hsieh and
Klenow, 2007b).1 In this paper, we ﬁrst document that an important distinction between
sectors is their average establishment size: Establishments in tradable and investment goods
sectors are on average much larger than those in the non-tradable sector. Our premise is that
such scale diﬀerences reﬂect sectoral diﬀerences in the technology used by their production
units. We propose and quantify a theory of aggregate and sectoral TFP based on cross-sector
diﬀerences in the optimal scale of establishments and cross-country diﬀerences in ﬁnancial
development.
Financial frictions aﬀect productivity of sectors by distorting the allocation of capi-
tal among heterogeneous establishments and also their entry and exit decisions. In our
model, consistent with the data, those sectors in which poor countries are particularly
unproductive—e.g. investment goods and tradable goods sectors—diﬀer from others in that
their establishments operate most eﬃciently at larger scales. Larger scales come with more
ﬁnancing needs, rendering the large-scale sector disproportionately more vulnerable to ﬁnan-
cial frictions. In the large-scale sector, it takes longer for a talented-but-poor entrepreneur
to self-ﬁnance the capital needed for operating at a proﬁt-maximizing scale. The selection
of entrepreneurs into the large-scale sector is also based more on individuals’ wealth (or self-
ﬁnancing capability) and less on their entrepreneurial talent. These eﬀects explain why, for
example, tradable and investment goods sectors (i.e. large-scale sectors) are particularly un-
productive relative to non-tradable and consumption goods sectors (i.e. small-scale sectors)
in countries with underdeveloped ﬁnancial markets.
More speciﬁcally, we study an economy with two sectors that diﬀer in their per-period
ﬁxed costs required of running an establishment. Diﬀerences in ﬁxed costs lead to diﬀerences
in the optimal scale of establishments. In the model, individuals choose in each period
whether to operate an establishment—become an entrepreneur—or to supply labor for a
wage. Individuals diﬀer in their productivity as an entrepreneur and in their wealth, with the
latter being endogenously determined by forward-looking saving decisions. The productivity
of entrepreneurs evolves stochastically, generating the need to reallocate factors of production
from previously-productive to currently-productive entrepreneurs.
Financial frictions hinder this reallocation process. We model ﬁnancial frictions in the
1Balassa (1964) and Samuelson (1964) are the classic citations for tradables and non-tradables. Jones
(1994), Eaton and Kortum (2001), and Herrendorf and Valentinyi (2006) are more recent contributions.
1form of collateral constraints on capital rental, which ultimately arise from imperfect en-
forceability of contracts. In an economy with perfect credit markets, sectoral and occupa-
tional choices are based on comparative advantage: The most talented individuals become
entrepreneurs and the allocation of capital equalizes marginal products of capital across
sectors and establishments. With ﬁnancial frictions in the form of collateral constraints,
entrepreneurs’ production and individuals’ occupational decisions are constrained by their
available wealth. This leads to distortions along three margins that lower sectoral and ag-
gregate TFP. First, for a given set of heterogeneous production units in operation, ﬁnancial
frictions distort the allocation of capital among them (misallocation of capital). Second, for
a given number of production units in operation, ﬁnancial frictions distort the allocation of
talents into entrepreneurship and into sectors, with talented-but-poor individuals delaying
their entry and incompetent-but-rich entrepreneurs remaining in business for longer (misal-
location of talent). Third, ﬁnancial frictions distort the number of production units for a
given distribution of entrepreneurial talent in an economy.
We use our model to provide a quantitative analysis of the cross-country pattern in aggre-
gate and sectoral TFP. We discipline the analysis by requiring that a benchmark model with
well-functioning ﬁnancial markets matches US data on the establishment size distribution
across and within sectors (e.g., average scale and thick right-tails of broadly-deﬁned sectors),
the dynamics of establishments, and income concentration. We then employ data on the use
of external ﬁnancing to calibrate the variation in ﬁnancial development across countries and
quantify its eﬀect. Finally, we use cross-country data on the establishment size distribution
across sectors as over-identifying restrictions and test additional implications of our model.
We ﬁnd that ﬁnancial frictions have sizable eﬀects on per-capita income, aggregate TFP
and sectoral TFP.
The variation in ﬁnancial development can explain a factor-of-two diﬀerence in per-capita
income across countries, or almost 80 per cent of the diﬀerence in per-capita income between
Mexico and the US. One thing to note is that the agricultural sector is not modeled or
analyzed here. This factor-of-two diﬀerence goes a long way in explaining the factor-of-ﬁve
diﬀerence in non-agricultural per-capita income between the richest ﬁfth percentile and the
poorest ﬁfth percentile of countries. Consistent with the consensus view in the literature,
most of per-capita income diﬀerences in our model are accounted for by lower TFP in less
developed economies. For example, our model predicts that a country ranking in the bottom
third of the world in terms of ﬁnancial development will have TFP at least 40 per cent below
that of the US.
Financial frictions generate particularly low TFP in sectors with large scales of operation,
e.g. the tradable and investment goods sectors. While TFP declines by up to 30 per cent in
the small-scale sector, TFP in the large-scale sector declines by more than 50 per cent. These
2diﬀerential eﬀects on productivity lead to a large impact on relative prices, with a higher
relative price of goods produced with large-scale technologies in ﬁnancially-underdeveloped
economies. For instance, the model accounts for almost all (95 per cent) of the observed
elasticity of the relative price of tradables to non-tradables with respect to per-capita income
(the Balassa-Samuelson eﬀect).
Our quantitative analysis provides a clear decomposition of the main margins distorted
by ﬁnancial frictions. While there is a signiﬁcant role for the misallocation of capital in
explaining the absolute diﬀerences in TFP across countries, the misallocation of talent into
entrepreneurship and into sectors has a prominent role in explaining the particularly large
diﬀerences in the TFP of the large-scale sector. Whereas the misallocation of capital explains
90 per cent of the lower TFP in the small-scale sector, it only explains half of the TFP
diﬀerences in the large-scale sector. It is the misallocation of talent that accounts for the
other half of the TFP diﬀerences in the large-scale sector. The distortion on the number of
entrepreneurs per se has only minor impact on productivity in either sector.
Our theory is built on two premises: cross-country diﬀerences in ﬁnancial development
and cross-sector diﬀerences in the optimal scale of establishments. Both of these underlying
premises have strong empirical support.
The ﬁrst premise, cross-country diﬀerences in ﬁnancial development—underdevelopment
in poor countries in particular, has been well established in the literature. King and Levine
(1993a) and Beck et al. (2000) show that aggregate measures of credit and ﬁnancial devel-
opment are closely correlated with output per capita across countries, while La Porta et al.
(1998) document that these macro indicators are strongly related to underlying institutional
diﬀerences such as the enforcement of contracts, creditor protection, and so on. Banerjee and
Duﬂo (2005) review the literature documenting micro-level evidence for credit constraints
in poor countries and for the resulting misallocation of capital. In his detailed analysis of
Thailand, Townsend (2006) links observed misallocation to micro-level credit constraints and
shows how their relaxation through ﬁnancial development leads to faster economic growth.
One empirical contribution of our paper is to establish the second premise: cross-sector
diﬀerences in scale, deﬁned as workers per establishment. Using detailed sector-level data
from the OECD countries (the US in particular), we document that the average size of
establishments varies substantially across broadly-deﬁned sectors. For example, the average
establishment in the tradable sector is three times as large as that in the non-tradable
sector. This sectoral diﬀerence in establishment size is robustly observed in a wide range
of countries. Furthermore, using price data from a cross-section of countries, we show that,
at a more disaggregate level, poor countries are particularly unproductive in industries with
larger scales.
In our model, ﬁnancial frictions have diﬀerential impacts on sectors with diﬀerent scales
3because our notion of scale (establishment size) translates directly into ﬁnancing needs. The
most widely-used empirical metric of ﬁnancing needs is “external dependence” constructed
by Rajan and Zingales (1998). We compute the external dependence for broadly-deﬁned
sectors in the US, and ﬁnd that sectors with larger scales (manufactured consumption and
equipment investment, which compose the tradable sector) also have larger external depen-
dence, providing additional support for our mechanism.
Our mechanism for diﬀerential impact of ﬁnancial frictions across sectors produces a
novel and testable implication on the relative scale of sectors in an economy with ﬁnancial
frictions. Financial frictions, together with the resulting higher relative price of the large-
scale sector output and lower wages in the equilibrium, lead to too many entrepreneurs with
too small establishments in the sector with small ﬁxed costs, and too few entrepreneurs
with too large establishments in the sector with large ﬁxed costs. Using OECD data on
11 countries in diﬀerent stages of economic development, we show that the relative size
of establishments/enterprises in the large-scale, tradable sector to those in the small-scale,
non-tradable sector is indeed larger in less developed economies, consistent with our model
prediction. We supplement this evidence with a detailed case study of the US and Mexico,
using data on absolute scale from their respective Economic Census data (based on the com-
mon, and hence comparable, North American Industrial Classiﬁcation System) and a survey
of small businesses in Mexico (which provides data on small-scale, mobile, and informal en-
trepreneurs). We ﬁnd empirical support for our model prediction on how ﬁnancial frictions
have diﬀerential impacts on the absolute scale of diﬀerent sectors. Average scale in Mexico
is substantially smaller overall, but within the tradable sector, industries with large-scale
establishments in the US tend to have even larger establishments in Mexico. To the best of
our knowledge, these empirical ﬁndings at the sector level have not been documented in the
literature.2
Related Literature This paper contributes to a vast literature relating ﬁnancial frictions
and entrepreneurship to development, including theoretical contributions by: Banerjee and
Newman (1993), King and Levine (1993b), Aghion and Bolton (1997), Piketty (1997), and
Lloyd-Ellis and Bernhardt (2000); and relatively fewer quantitatively-oriented macro studies
by: Gin´ e and Townsend (2004), Amaral and Quintin (2005), Caselli and Gennaioli (2005),
Jeong and Townsend (2007), and Buera and Shin (2008).3
This paper is more closely related and complementary to two others in the literature
2Our ﬁndings do conform to the conventional wisdom of a “missing middle” in poor countries (Tybout,
2000).
3This paper builds on Buera and Shin (2008) by extending their analysis to a multi-sector environment
with ﬁxed-cost technologies. The eﬀects of ﬁnancial frictions on per-capita income are two-thirds larger in
an economy with ﬁxed-cost technologies relative to the environment in Buera and Shin that abstracts from
sectoral diﬀerences in ﬁxed costs and scale.
4that emphasize the diﬀerential eﬀects of ﬁnancial frictions on diﬀerent industries. Rajan and
Zingales (1998), an empirical paper, creates an index of dependence on external sources
of ﬁnancing for various manufacturing industries, and tests whether industries that are
particularly dependent on ﬁnancing grow relatively faster in countries with more developed
ﬁnancial markets. We reconstruct their measure of industry-speciﬁc ﬁnancial dependence
for our analysis, and show that our measure of sectoral scale (workers per establishment) is
closely related to external dependence. For instance, the tradable sector not only has a larger
scale than the non-tradable sector, but also has a higher external dependence.4 Note that
we study the impact of ﬁnancial frictions on the level of sectoral productivity rather than
their impact on the growth rate of sectoral output. Erosa and Hidalgo Cabrillana (2008)
is a theoretical paper showing how ﬁnancial frictions can have diﬀerential eﬀects on the
productivity of manufacturing industries with diﬀerent ﬁxed-cost requirements. Our paper
diﬀers from these two papers in three ways. First, our analysis explicitly combines data and
theory to quantify the eﬀect of ﬁnancial development on sectoral productivity. Second, we
introduce scale as an empirical measure related to ﬁxed costs and ﬁnancing needs. Finally, we
broaden the analysis to encompass both tradable (large-scale) and non-tradable (small-scale)
sectors.
A literature in international trade provides theoretical analyses and empirical evidence
for how ﬁnancial frictions may aﬀect the comparative advantage of countries. Theoretical
contributions include Kletzer and Bardhan (1987), Matsuyama (2005), Wynne (2005) and
Manova (2008b). Beck (2002) and Manova (2008a), among others, show empirically that
ﬁnancially-underdeveloped countries tend to specialize in sectors that are not ﬁnancially
dependent. We complement this literature by developing a quantitatively-oriented dynamic
model that can potentially be used to assess the role of ﬁnancial development on the pattern
of trade.
Finally, we add to the broader literature on the role of micro-level distortions (Hsieh and
Klenow, 2007a; Guner et al., 2008; Restuccia and Rogerson, 2008). Our results complement
the empirical ﬁndings of Hsieh and Klenow (2007a) in particular. They ﬁnd a factor-of-
two diﬀerence in manufacturing TFP due to the misallocation of capital and labor. We
explicitly model one source of such misallocation (ﬁnancial frictions), and include the non-
tradable sector in our analysis. Furthermore, we explore how distortions aﬀect the entry and
exit decisions of establishments.
The next section documents the key facts that motivate our analysis. Section 3 develops
the model, and characterizes the perfect-credit benchmark. Section 4 presents the quanti-
tative experiments and evaluates the model implications on sectoral scales using detailed
4A strand of the empirical literature has examined the independent eﬀects of scale and ﬁnancing needs
(Beck et al., 2008).
5sectoral data from the US, Mexico and other OECD countries. Section 5 concludes.
2 Facts
This section documents the key empirical facts motivating our study. First, we revisit a
well-known case of sectoral productivity diﬀerences across countries, the Balassa-Samuelson
eﬀect—the positive relationship between relative productivity in tradable goods and output
per worker. We also show that a similar relationship holds between relative productivity
and ﬁnancial development. Second, we point out that there are large diﬀerences in scale of
operation among broadly-deﬁned sectors, e.g. tradable vs. non-tradable sectors. We empha-
size this sectoral diﬀerence in scale, rather than tradability of goods per se, in interpreting
the relative productivity of sectors. We further show that this relationship between relative
productivity and scales of operation holds at a more disaggregated level as well: Goods
that are produced with large-scale technologies in developed countries tend to be relatively
more expensive in developing economies, reﬂecting their low relative productivity in these
industries.
Relative Productivity and Development The ﬁrst example of cross-country diﬀer-
ences in relative productivity of sectors was documented by Balassa (1964) and Samuelson
(1964). The Balassa-Samuelson fact is that in poor countries the prices of tradable goods
are high relative to those of non-tradable goods. Figure 1 conﬁrms this fact using the 1996
ICP benchmark by plotting the relative price of tradables against output per worker from
the Penn World Tables 6.2.5 Here the relative price is compiled by creating Geary-Khamis
aggregated prices for the tradable and the non-tradable sectors using 27 disaggregated prod-
uct categories.6 The log relative prices (tradables to non-tradables) have a strong negative
relationship with the log of output per worker across countries. The slope coeﬃcient of -0.37
is highly signiﬁcant with a standard error of 0.04, and the regression has an R2 of 0.42.
This relationship can be interpreted as reﬂecting a lower total factor productivity of trad-
ables relative to non-tradables in poor countries. Indeed, in models with constant-returns-
to-scale aggregate production functions and equal factor shares across sectors, relative prices
5ICP stands for the International Comparison Programme of the United Nations. There are 115 ICP
benchmark countries in 1996. For the sake of maintaining a consistent sample, we present results based on
the 102 countries for which Beck et al. (2000) constructed data on ﬁnancial development. The results using
all 115 countries are virtually identical.
6The tradables category consists of clothing, nine food and beverage categories, footwear, fuel, fur-
niture/ﬂoor coverings, household appliances, household textiles and other household goods, machin-
ery/equipment, tobacco, and transportation equipment. The non-tradables category consists of commu-
nication, construction, education, medical/health, recreation/culture, rent and water, restaurants/hotels,
and transportation services. We do not classify four ﬁnal goods price categories: changes in stocks, collective
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Fig. 1: Relative price of tradables to non-tradables against GDP per worker.
equal the inverse of relative TFP. See, for example, Hsieh and Klenow (2007b). Diﬀerences
in factor shares and the relative supply of factors (e.g., higher levels of physical capital
or human capital per worker) could break this inverse relationship, but empirically factor
shares do not vary much across sectors, and if anything, the non-tradable sector tends to
be more intensive in human and physical capital.7 In this paper, we explore the root of this
relationship between the relative TFP of sectors and output per worker.
Relative Productivity and Financial Development A common measure of a country’s
level of ﬁnancial development is its ratio of external ﬁnancing (the sum of private credit,
private bond market capitalization, and stock market capitalization) to GDP (La Porta
et al., 1998; Rajan and Zingales, 1998; Beck et al., 2000). The relationship between relative
prices and external ﬁnancing to GDP ratios is quite similar to the one between relative prices
and GDP in Figure 1. The estimated elasticity of 0.32 is slightly lower, but the R2 of 0.50
is slightly higher.
The strength of the relationship suggests that ﬁnancial development is potentially closely
related to the Balassa-Samuelson fact. In the model we develop, it is ﬁnancial development
that is the causal force behind the cross-country diﬀerences in both relative prices and output
per worker.
7See Valentinyi and Herrendorf (2008) for physical capital intensity, and Buera and Kaboski (2008) for
human capital intensity.
7Scale Diﬀerences across Sectors Another key empirical fact that motivates our study is
the clear diﬀerence in the scale of production units across broadly-deﬁned sectors. Our inter-
pretation is that this sectoral scale diﬀerence reﬂects diﬀerences in production technologies
across these sectors. We will argue that these technological diﬀerences interact with ﬁnan-
cial development, so that ﬁnancial development aﬀects large-scale and small-scale sectors
diﬀerently.
Here we use two measures for scale of operation: workers per establishment and workers
per enterprise. Establishments are locations of business, so that a single enterprise, Walmart,
for example, may have multiple establishments. Table 1 presents measures of average scale
across broadly-deﬁned ﬁnal goods sectors of the US and other OECD countries, and com-
pares these scale measures with other sector-level technological characteristics like ﬁnancial














Manufactured Consumption (M) 42 20 0.27 0.33
Services (S) 16 8 0.09 0.27
Equipment Investment (E) 81 35 0.14 0.29
Construction (C) 10 7 0.08 0.17
Tradables (M+E) 48 28 0.21 0.31
Non-tradables (S+C) 15 8 0.08 0.26
Table 1: The averages are worker-weighted averages across four-digit industries in the OECD
SSIS data, and across eight-digit industries in the US census data. The OECD data cover nine
countries, and are complete at the enterprise level: Czech Republic, France, Germany, Hungary,
Slovakia, Poland, Portugal, the UK and the US. The external dependence ratio is calculated using
the formula of Rajan and Zingales (1998). They measure the ratio of the diﬀerence between capital
expenditures and cash ﬂow to capital expenditures. In order to negate the inﬂuence of outliers, we
follow their methodology of using the total capital expenditures and total cash ﬂow over the sample
period (1993–2003) to compute ﬁrm-speciﬁc numbers, and then report the median value within an
industry as the industry-speciﬁc value. Capital shares are from Valentinyi and Herrendorf (2008).
They correspond to the capital share of gross output in each of these broadly-deﬁned sectors, and
are calculated using input-output data from the Industry Accounts of the Bureau of Economic
Analysis.
8These sectors are constructed to be consistent with the ﬁnal goods categories in the ICP data. Manu-
facturing consumption includes food/beverages, textiles, clothing, medicine, furniture, appliances, TVs and
radios, cars, household items, and media. Equipment includes all manufactured equipment not included
in consumption. Together, these two constitute tradables. Services include accommodation/food services,
arts/entertainment, communication, education, FIRE, health, retail, sewage, transportation, and wholesale.
8The ﬁrst column is based on data from the 2002 US Economic Census, which uses an
establishment basis and the NAICS eight-digit classiﬁcation. The second column is based on
the OECD Structural Statistics for Industry and Services (SSIS) database for 2002. These
data follow the common ISIC 3.2 four-digit classiﬁcation, enabling comparison across OECD
countries. Enterprise-level data permit comparison over the largest set of countries: Czech
Republic, France, Germany, Hungary, Slovakia, Poland, Portugal, the UK and the US.9
Whether establishments or enterprises are the unit of measurement, the average scale
varies considerably across these broadly-deﬁned sectors. The top panel shows the average
scale in manufactured consumption, services, equipment investment, and construction. Man-
ufactured consumption and equipment investment establishments tend to operate at a large
scale, while services and construction establishments have smaller scales. This distinction
is precisely the tradables vs. non-tradables dichotomy in the bottom panel. The tradable
sector has a substantially larger scale than the non-tradable sector.10 In the US census data
for workers per establishment, the typical tradable establishment is over 3.2 times as large
as its non-tradable counterpart (48 vs. 15). The relative scale of tradables to non-tradables
is even larger with enterprises as the unit of observation. For the OECD average, the ra-
tio is 3.5 (28 vs. 8). Establishments are our preferred unit of analysis because we think
they embody production technologies, but some technologies (e.g., the distribution system
of Walmart) may be at the ﬁrm level. Data availability dictates which measure we use in
certain cases.
In our model, ﬁnancial frictions have diﬀerential impact on sectors with diﬀerent scales
because our notion of scale (workers per establishment or enterprise) coincides with ﬁnanc-
ing needs. Support for this interpretation can be obtained by comparing other measures
of ﬁnancing needs across sectors. The third column reports the measures of external de-
pendence (Rajan and Zingales, 1998) that we construct using the US Compustat data for
1993–2003.11 In the Compustat data, ﬁrms in the tradable sector are substantially more
ﬁnancially-dependent than those in the non-tradable sector, with a median of 0.21 vs. 0.08.12
9There are also subtle diﬀerences in the deﬁnition of workers between the two samples. In particular, the
SSIS data measure “number of persons engaged,” which can include some temporary or contract workers.
The census data record “number of employees,” which excludes proprietors. For some countries, SSIS data
have both measures, and the two mirror each other closely.
10We lack comparable scale data for agriculture, another component of tradables. In advanced economies,
land/capital investment per farm is substantial, but workers per farm may not be large.
11Rajan and Zingales measure the ratio of the diﬀerence between capital expenditures (Compustat #128)
and cash ﬂow (Compustat #110, or the sum of #123, 125, 126, 106, 213, and 217, for format code 7) to
capital expenditures. In order to negate the inﬂuence of outliers in noisy ﬁrm-level data, they take the total
capital expenditures and total cash ﬂow over the sample period to compute ﬁrm-speciﬁc numbers, and then
pick the median value within an industry as the industry-speciﬁc value. Note that Rajan and Zingales only
included the manufacturing sector in their study.
12Alternative measures of ﬁrms’ ﬁnancing needs give a similar picture. For example, we have constructed
a measure of setup costs. In particular, for each ﬁrm in Compustat, we have located the ﬁrst period with
9Furthermore, diﬀerences in external dependence line up fairly closely with diﬀerences in scale
at a more disaggregated level (top panel of Table 1). While external dependence may be a
more direct measure of ﬁnancing needs or investment requirements, we decide to focus on
scale (employment), a measure that is available for all ﬁrms and sectors in the economy, as
opposed to just the publicly-traded ﬁrms in Compustat.13
Finally, the fourth column reports the sectoral diﬀerences in factor intensities. These
numbers are from Valentinyi and Herrendorf (2008), and correspond to the capital share
of gross output in each of these broadly-deﬁned sectors. Unlike diﬀerences in scale and
external dependence, the variation in factor intensity is relatively small and does not show a
consistent pattern across sectors. The diﬀerence between services and equipment investment
is negligible, and only for construction we observe a signiﬁcantly lower capital intensity. Chari
et al. (1997) also ﬁnd little diﬀerence in factor shares between investment and consumption
goods sectors, with, if anything, investment goods producers being more labor-intensive.
The relatively small variation in factor intensity across sectors leads us to follow the recent
literature (Chari et al., 1997; Hsieh and Klenow, 2007b) and build a model that abstracts
from these diﬀerences. Our focus is instead on the large observed diﬀerences in scale across
sectors.
Relative Prices and Scale We have seen that the relative price of tradables is high in
poor countries, and that tradable establishments operate at larger scales than non-tradable
establishments. A natural question to ask is whether relative prices and the scale of produc-
tion technologies are related at a more disaggregated level as well. We examine this issue
using disaggregated ICP price data from its 1996 benchmark. The scale of operation in an
industry is constructed by averaging across eight countries for which comparable data are
available.14 We then map ICP categories into closely related groups of industries and calcu-
late the average scale for these industry groups.15 Finally, we run a cross-country regression
positive excess investment, and calculated the average excess investment over following consecutive periods
with positive excess investment. For the ﬁrms in the tradable sector, the ratio of this measure over annual
sales has a median of 0.65, while for those in the non-tradable sector, a median of 0.12.
13See Davis et al. (2006) for an example where conclusions drawn from the universe of ﬁrms and from the
set of publicly-traded ﬁrms can be very diﬀerent.
14OECD SSIS data—which cover all industries, not just manufacturing—are available for eight countries
(Czech Republic, France, Germany, Hungary, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, and the UK), but only at the
enterprise level. We therefore use number of persons engaged per enterprise as our measure of scale. For
any given industry at a disaggregated level, there is a strong correlation in scale across countries. Still,
we average across many countries to smooth out idiosyncratic variations that may arise from local market
structures, government regulations, and so on.
15A reliable mapping could not be done for four of the 29 ICP categories: other household goods, operation
of transportation equipment, other goods and services, and collective consumption by the government. Also,
due to the lack of comparable data on agriculture, only the scale of food manufacturing establishments could
be used. It is at least comforting that none of the food categories appears to be outliers.
10of 2,794 disaggregated ICP price data from 112 countries on log output per worker, log in-







log ¯ lj − 0.10
(−6.2)
logyi log¯ lj, R
2 = 0.21,
where pi,j is the 1996 price of industry j goods in country i, yi is the output per worker
of country i in 1996 international prices, ¯ lj is the average number of workers engaged per
enterprise for industry j. The negative coeﬃcient on the interaction term indicates that
prices of the output of industries with larger scales are relatively higher in low income
countries. Given the log diﬀerence between tradables and non-tradables scales in Table 1—
i.e., log(48/15) = 1.2, the coeﬃcient of -0.10 implies a relative price elasticity with respect
to output per worker of 12 percent, about one-third of the full relationship in Figure 1.
The general magnitude and signiﬁcance of this result at the ﬁve-percent level are robust.
Alternative speciﬁcations used country-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects instead of controlling for logyi,
and/or category-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects instead of controlling for log¯ lj. Yet another speciﬁcation
substituted countries’ ratios of external ﬁnance to GDP for logyi. The signiﬁcance of the

























































































Workers/Establishment in the U.S., 2002
Fig. 2: Industry-speciﬁc elasticity of relative price with respect to income across countries (vertical
axis) plotted against industry-speciﬁc scale (horizontal axis).
We visually represent this result in Figure 2. First, for each sector j, we run a cross-
country regression of the log of sectoral price (pi,j relative to country PPP) on log output
11per worker (logyi). These sector-speciﬁc regression coeﬃcients (income elasticities of relative
prices, vertical axis) are plotted against sectoral scales (horizontal axis) in Figure 2. These
coeﬃcients have a downward slope of -0.15; that is, the relative price of goods produced in
larger-scale industries will increase more when moving from rich to poor countries.
We conclude that, even at a more disaggregate level, poor countries are particularly un-
productive in industries with larger scales. This is further evidence supporting our emphasis
on sectoral scale diﬀerences.
3 Model
We model an economy with two sectors, S (small-scale, non-tradable sector) and L (large-
scale, tradable consumption and investment goods sector). In each sector, there are two
occupations: worker and entrepreneur. The economy is open and takes the price of goods
produced with large-scale technologies (tradables) as given; in the stationary equilibria that
we consider, with only one tradable good, openness will simply ﬁx the price of the tradable
output, which is our numeraire.
There are a measure N of inﬁnitely-lived individuals, who are heterogeneous in their
wealth and the quality of their entrepreneurial ideas, z = (zS,zL). Individuals’ wealth is
determined endogenously by forward-looking behavior. The vector of entrepreneurial ideas
is drawn from a distribution µ(z). Entrepreneurial ideas “die” with a constant hazard rate
of 1 − γ, and a new vector of ideas is independently drawn from µ(z). The parameter γ
therefore controls the persistence of the entrepreneurial idea process.16
In each period, individuals choose their occupation: whether to work for a wage or to
operate a business in sector S or L. Their occupational choices are based on their comparative
advantage as an entrepreneur (z) and their access to capital. Access to capital is limited
by agents’ wealth because capital rental contracts may not be perfectly enforceable in our
model, giving rise to an endogenous collateral constraint.
One entrepreneur can operate only one production unit (establishment) in a given period.
Entrepreneurial ideas are inalienable, and there is no market for managers or entrepreneurial
talent. The way we model an establishment draws upon the span of control of Lucas (1978)
and per-period ﬁxed costs as in Rossi-Hansberg and Wright (2007).
Preferences Individual preferences are described by the following expected utility function
over sequences of consumption ct = (cS,t,cL,t):
16This shock can be interpreted as changes in market conditions that aﬀect the proﬁtability of individual
skills. Alternatively, in a life-cycle interpretation of the model, the current generation dies and is replaced
with an oﬀspring that does not share the same talent. In either of these interpretations, we model productivity
to follow a very persistent process in between the arrival of idea shocks.
















/(1 − σ), β is the discount factor, σ the coeﬃcient of
risk-aversion (and the reciprocal of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution), and ε the
intratemporal elasticity of substitution between goods produced with small and large-scale
technologies. The expectation is over the realizations of entrepreneurial ideas (z), which
depend on stochastic death of ideas (1 − γ) and on draws from µ(z).
Technology At the beginning of each period, an individual with vector of entrepreneurial
ideas z and wealth a chooses whether to work for a wage w or operate a business in either
sector j = S,L. To operate a business in a sector, individuals must pay a sector-speciﬁc
per-period ﬁxed cost of κj, in units of the sector’s output. The crucial assumption is that
the ﬁxed cost to run an establishment in the large-scale sector is higher than that in the
small-scale sector, κL > κS. This will generate the scale diﬀerence between the two sectors
that we observe in the data. In our quantitative analysis, we will set κS to zero.
After paying the ﬁxed cost, an entrepreneur with talent zj produces using capital (k) and
labor (l) according to:
zjf (k,l) = zjkαlθ,
where α and θ are the elasticities of output with respect to capital and labor, and α+θ < 1,
implying diminishing returns to scale in variable factors at the establishment level. Note
that the factor elasticities are assumed to be the same in both sectors, which is consistent
with the empirical ﬁndings in the literature (Chari et al., 1997; Valentinyi and Herrendorf,
2008).
Given factor prices w and R (rental rate of capital), the proﬁt of an entrepreneur is:
πj (k,l;R,w,p) = pjzjkαlθ − Rk − wl − (1 + r)pjκj,
where r is the interest rate, and pj is the price of sector j goods. Sector S produces non-
tradable consumption goods, and the output from sector L is investment goods and tradable
consumption goods. We normalize pL to one. For later use, we deﬁne the optimal level of









pjzjkαlθ − Rk − wl
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The key feature of this technology is that the ﬁxed costs introduce non-convexity. For any
strictly positive ﬁxed cost κj, the technology is feasible only if operated above the minimum
scale; i.e., zjkαlθ ≥ (1 + r)κj.17
17The model can be extended to allow for a choice of technologies within each sector: a technology with
13Credit and Rental Markets Individuals have access to competitive ﬁnancial intermedi-
aries, who (i) receive deposits, (ii) rent capital k at rate R, and (iii) lend to entrepreneurs
their ﬁxed cost pjκj. In the benchmark model, we restrict the analysis to the case where both
borrowing and capital rental are within a period—that is, a ≥ 0. The zero-proﬁt condition
implies R = r + δ, where r is the deposit and lending rate and δ is the depreciation rate.
Borrowing and capital rental by entrepreneurs are limited by imperfect enforceability of
contracts. In particular, we assume that, after production has taken place, entrepreneurs
have the option to renege on the contracts. In such cases, the entrepreneurs can keep
a fraction (1 − φ) of the undepreciated capital and the revenue net of labor payments,
(1 − φ)[pjzjf (k,l) − wl + (1 − δ)k]. The only punishment is the garnishment of their
ﬁnancial assets deposited with the ﬁnancial intermediary, a. In the following period, this
entrepreneur in default will regain access to ﬁnancial markets, and will not be treated any
diﬀerently despite the history of default.
Note that φ indexes the strength of an economy’s legal institutions enforcing contractual
obligations. This one-dimensional parameter captures the extent of frictions in the ﬁnancial
market due to imperfect enforcement of credit and rental contracts. This speciﬁcation allows
for a ﬂexible modeling of limited commitment that spans economies with no credit (φ = 0)
and with perfect credit markets (φ = 1).
We consider equilibria where the borrowing and capital rental contracts are incentive-
compatible and are hence fulﬁlled. In particular, we study equilibria where the rental of
capital is quantity-restricted by an upper bound ¯ kj (a,zj;φ), which is a sector-speciﬁc func-
tion of the individual state (a,zj). We choose the rental limits ¯ kj (a,zj;φ) to be the largest
limits that are consistent with entrepreneurs choosing to abide by their rental and borrow-
ing contracts. Without loss of generality, we assume ¯ kj (a,zj;φ) ≤ ku
j (z), where ku
j is the
proﬁt-maximizing capital inputs in an unconstrained (static) problem in sector j.
The following proposition provides a simple characterization of the set of enforceable
contracts and the rental limits ¯ kj (a,zj;φ), for j = S,L.
Proposition 1 Capital rental k in sector j by an entrepreneur with wealth a and talent zj
is enforceable if and only if
max
l
{pjzjf (k,l) − wl} − Rk − (1 + r)pjκj + (1 + r)a




{pjzjf (k,l) − wl} + (1 − δ)k
 
. (2)
a small ﬁxed cost and low productivity, A1,jzjkαlθ − κ1, and a technology with a large ﬁxed cost and high
productivity, A2,jzjkαlθ − κ2, with A2,j > A1,j for j = S,L and κ2 > κ1. Note that in this extension ﬁxed
costs are technology speciﬁc and not sector speciﬁc. One can think of our current setup as a case where the
productivity gains associated with the κ2-technology is substantially larger for the large-scale sector; i.e.,
A2,L ≫ A2,S.
14Therefore, the upper bound on capital rental that is consistent with entrepreneurs choosing to
abide by their rental and borrowing contracts can be represented with a function ¯ kj (a,zj;φ),
which is increasing in a, zj and φ.
Condition (2) states that the economic resources of an entrepreneur repaying her rental
and credit obligations (left-hand side) have to be at least as large as those of a defaulting
entrepreneur (right-hand side). This condition is suﬃcient to characterize enforceable allo-
cations because we assume that defaulting entrepreneurs regain access to ﬁnancial markets
in the following period.
This proposition also provides a convenient way to operationalize the enforceability con-
straint into a simple rental limit ¯ kj (a,zj;φ).18 As long as the unconstrained level of capi-
tal rental is not enforceable, the rental limit ¯ kj (a,zj;φ) is implicitly deﬁned as the larger
root of the equation given by the equality in condition (2). Rental limits increase with
the wealth of entrepreneurs, because the punishment for defaulting (loss of collateral) gets
larger. Similarly, rental limits increase with the talent of an entrepreneur because defaulting
entrepreneurs keep only a fraction 1 − φ of the output. In the rest of the paper, we restrict
individuals’ capital inputs to be less than or equal to the rental limit ¯ kj (a,zj;φ).
While the enforceability of contracts as measured by φ is not sector-speciﬁc, the equi-
librium enforceable rental contracts, as captured by the rental limits ¯ kj (a,zj;φ), do vary
across sectors because of the diﬀerences in technology and in output prices across sectors.
Recursive Representation of Individuals’ Problem Here we discuss the problem
solved by individuals. In particular, we deﬁne the value for an individual before the oc-
cupational choice, v(a,z), as well as the value of being a worker, vw (a,z), and being an
entrepreneur in sector j, vj (a,z), for j = S,L.
Individuals maximize (1) by choosing sequences of consumption, ﬁnancial wealth, occu-
pations (including the sector), and capital/labor inputs if they choose to be entrepreneurs,
subject to a sequence of period budget constraints and rental limits.
At the beginning of a period, an individual’s state is summarized by her wealth, a, and
the vector of abilities, z. The individual then chooses between being a worker or being an
entrepreneur in sector S or L for the period. The value for an individual at this stage,
v(a,z), is the maximum over the value of being a worker, vw (a,z), and the value of being
an entrepreneur in sector j, vj (a,z), for j = S,L:








18In general, the set of enforceable capital rentals dictated by (2) does not exactly correspond to k ≤
¯ kj (a,zj;φ). For example, an entrepreneur who is only oﬀered a very low (and unproﬁtable) level of capital
will default if pjκj is large enough. Notwithstanding this, the solution to the individual’s problem subject to
(2) coincides with the solution to the individual’s problem subject to the simpler rental limit k ≤ ¯ kj (a,zj;φ).
15Note that the value of being a worker, vw (a,z), depends on her assets a and on her en-
trepreneurial ideas z, which may be implemented at a later date. Similarly, the value of
being an entrepreneur in sector j, vj (a,z), depends on the entire vector of entrepreneurial
ideas, as she may switch sectors at a later date.
As a worker, an individual chooses consumption bundle c = (cS,cL) and the next period’s
assets a′ to maximize her continuation value subject to the period budget constraint:
vw (a,z) = max
c,a′≥0
u(c) + β [γv (a′,z) + (1 − γ)Ez′ [v (a′,z′)]] (4)
s.t. pc + a′ ≤ w + (1 + r)a,
where w is her labor income, and p denotes the vector of goods prices. The continuation
value is a function of the end-of-period state (a′,z′), where z′ = z with probability γ and
z′ ∼ µ(z′) with probability 1 − γ. In the subsequent period, she will face an occupational
choice again, and the function v(a,z) appears in the continuation value.
Alternatively, individuals can choose to become an entrepreneur in sector j. The value
function of being an entrepreneur in sector j is as follows.
vj (a,z) = max
c,a′,k,l≥0
u(c) + β [γv (a′,z) + (1 − γ)Ez′ [v (a′,z′)]] (5)
s.t. pc + a
′ ≤ pjzjf (k,l) − Rk − wl − (1 + r)pjκj + (1 + r)a
k ≤ ¯ kj (a,zj;φ)
Note that an entrepreneur’s income is given by period proﬁt pjf (zj,k,l) − Rk − wl net of
ﬁxed costs (1 + r)pjκj plus the return to her initial wealth, and that her choices of capital
inputs are constrained by the rental limit ¯ kj (a,zj;φ).
Stationary Competitive Equilibrium A stationary competitive equilibrium is com-
posed of: an invariant distribution of wealth and entrepreneurial ideas G(a,z); occupation
choice function o(a,z), and policy functions c(a,z), a′ (a,z), l(a,z), and k (a,z); rental
limits ¯ kj (a,zj;φ), j = S,L; and prices w, R, r, and p such that:
1. Given ¯ kj (a,zj;φ), w, R, r and p, the individual policy functions o(a,z), c(a,z),
a′ (a,z), l(a,z), k (a,z) solve (3), (4) and (5);
2. Financial intermediaries make zero proﬁt, i.e., R = r + δ;
3. Rental limits ¯ kj (a,zj;φ) are the most generous limits satisfying condition (2), and
¯ kj (a,zj;φ) ≤ ku
j (zj);
4. Credit, labor, non-tradable consumption goods, and tradable consumption/investment
goods markets clear;




(˜ a,˜ z)∈{˜ z≤z,a′(˜ a,˜ z)≤a}
G(d˜ a,d˜ z) + (1 − γ)µ(z)
 
(˜ a,˜ z)∈{a′(˜ a,˜ z)≤a}
G(d˜ a,d˜ z).
Perfect-Credit Benchmark To clarify the basic mechanics of the model, we analyze the
perfect credit benchmark, φ = 1. This is an economy with unconstrained within-period
borrowing and capital rental for production (i.e., ¯ kj(a,zj,φ) = ku
j(z) for all a) but without
between-periods borrowing or consumption insurance. We present two results characterizing
the production side of the perfect-credit economy under the assumption that entrepreneurial
talents for the two sectors follow mutually independent Pareto distributions with the same
tail parameter η, (zL,zS) ∼ η2 (zLzS)
−(η+1). This assumption permits approximate closed-
form expressions for net sectoral production functions (i.e., sectoral output net of ﬁxed
costs), factor shares, and the establishment size distribution. The assumption of mutually-
independent Pareto distributions also implies that the establishment size distribution within
each sector exhibits a thick right tail, a salient feature of the data.19 These characterizations
will help us pin down the technological parameters of the model using data on establishment
size distributions across and within sectors.20
The ﬁrst result is that the net output of a sector is given by a Cobb-Douglas, constant-
returns-to-scale function of the population size (N), sectoral capital inputs (Kj) and labor
inputs (Lj).
Proposition 2 Assume that entrepreneurial talents for the two sectors follow mutually-
independent Pareto distributions with the same tail parameter η, (zS,zL) ∼ η2 (zSzL)
−(η+1),
and that active entrepreneurs are a small fraction of the population. Then the output of a
sector net of ﬁxed costs equals:




























19If instead entrepreneurial ideas were to be correlated across sectors, the model would deliver a thin tail
for the distribution of establishments in the sector with low ﬁxed costs, which is inconsistent with data.
20We solve the perfect-credit benchmark in two steps. First, given an aggregate supply of capital and the
intratemporal (homothetic) consumption decisions, we solve for optimal production decisions, occupation
choices, and prices. We then use the wage and entrepreneurial proﬁts coming from the production side of
the economy to solve for the saving decisions of individuals facing idiosyncratic shocks to entrepreneurial
ideas. By aggregating over individuals, we obtain the aggregate supply of capital. A stationary equilibrium
with perfect credit markets is a nested ﬁxed point of these two problems.
17It follows that, as in the standard neoclassical sectoral growth model, the elasticities of
output with respect to capital and labor are constant, α
α+θ+1/η and θ
α+θ+1/η, respectively.
Unlike in the standard model, however, the elasticities are not equal to the factor shares,











1 − α − θ − 1
η
 .
For realistic parameterizations of the model, 1 − α − θ −
1
η is close to zero, and hence
factor shares in the two sectors are approximately equal.
Our second result pertains to the establishment size distribution in the perfect-credit
benchmark. In particular, we show that the establishment size in each sector follows a
Pareto distribution with tail coeﬃcient η(1 − α − θ), and that the overall establishment size
distribution in the economy is a mixture of Pareto distributions. We also show that there
is a direct mapping between the ratio of ﬁxed costs to wage (pjκj/w) and the ratio between
the average establishment sizes (¯ lj) of the two sectors.
Proposition 3 Assume that entrepreneurial talents for the two sectors follow mutually-
independent Pareto distributions with the same tail parameter η, (zS,zL) ∼ η2 (zSzL)
−(η+1),
and that active entrepreneurs are a small fraction of the population. Then the establishment
size distribution in each sector follows the power law:
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, l ≥ l(ˆ zj),
where l(ˆ zj) is the employment in the marginal establishment. Furthermore, the establishment
size distribution in the aggregate economy is given by a mixture of Pareto distributions:
Pr
 












, l ≥ l(ˆ zS),
where nS and nL are respectively the fraction of small and large-scale establishments in the
economy, with nS +nL = 1. Also, the ratio of the average establishment size between the two
sectors is:
¯ lj/¯ lj′ = (pjκj + w)/(pj′κj′ + w).
This last result suggests a simple way of identifying the relative magnitude of ﬁxed
costs across sectors from the relative scale of sectors. In our model, the large scale of a
sector arises from the large ﬁxed costs at the establishment level. In addition, the tail
of the establishment size distribution identiﬁes the parameter governing the distribution of
entrepreneurial talents. In the next section, these observations will enable us to calibrate the
model in a transparent manner. We then study the impact of ﬁnancial frictions on aggregate
and sectoral productivity, and on the establishment size distribution.
184 Quantitative Analysis
In this section, we ﬁrst calibrate the perfect-credit benchmark of our model economy to the
US economy. We then conduct experiments to assess the eﬀect of ﬁnancial frictions. In
particular, we vary φ, the parameter governing the degree of ﬁnancial frictions, to obtain
variations in external ﬁnance to GDP ratios that are comparable to the range observed in
a cross-section of countries. We evaluate our model predictions for aggregate and sectoral
TFP, relative prices, and output per worker. Finally, we explore our model implications for
the relative scale of establishments across sectors using data from developing and developed
countries.
In our quantitative analysis we hold ﬁxed all technological parameters across countries,
and vary only the parameter governing ﬁnancial frictions (φ). In particular, we assume
(rather counterfactually) that countries are endowed with the same entrepreneurial talent dis-
tribution. We maintain this assumption because our goal is to isolate and quantify the direct
impact of ﬁnancial frictions. One of our main results is that, starting with the same potential
pool of entrepreneurs, ﬁnancial frictions distort the selection into active entrepreneurship.
The productivity distribution of entrepreneurs in operation therefore diﬀers across countries,
with ﬁnancial frictions lowering the mean and raising the variance of this distribution. The
eﬀect on the mean conforms to the conventional wisdom on aggregate productivity diﬀer-
ences across countries. The increase in variance is consistent with recent empirical work
of Hsieh and Klenow (2007a), who ﬁnd that less developed countries’ establishment-level
productivity (TFPQ in their terminology) dispersion is at least as large as that of the US. It
would be straightforward to incorporate cross-country diﬀerences in the average productivity
of potential entrepreneurs and workers by considering human capital and exogenous TFP
diﬀerences. It is less obvious how one would model exogenous cross-country diﬀerences in
higher moments of the entrepreneurial talent distribution.
4.1 Calibration
We calibrate preference and technology parameters so that the perfect-credit economy
matches key aspects of the US, a relatively undistorted economy. In particular, our target
moments include standard macroeconomic aggregates, features of the establishment size
distribution within and across sectors, establishment dynamics, and the concentration of
income in the population.
In our quantitative analysis we identify our small-scale sector with the non-tradable
sector, and our large-scale sector with those producing investment goods and tradable goods.
That is, we focus on the best-known case of sectoral productivity diﬀerences across countries,
19the Balassa-Samuelson eﬀect (Section 2).21
We need to specify values for ten parameters: four technological parameters, α, θ, κS, and
κL, and the depreciation rate δ; two parameters describing the process for entrepreneurial
talents, γ and η; the subjective discount factor β, the reciprocal of the intertemporal elasticity
of substitution σ, and the intratemporal elasticity of substitution ε.
Two preference parameters, σ and ε, and two technological parameters, α
α+θ and δ, can
be set to standard values in the literature. We let σ = 1.5 and ε = 1.0.22 The one-year
depreciation rate is set at δ = 0.058, and we choose α
α+θ to match the aggregate capital
income share of 0.33.
We are thus left with the six parameters that are more speciﬁc to our study: α + θ, κS,
κL, η, γ, and β.23 We calibrate them to match six relevant moments in the US data as shown
in the ﬁrst column of Table 2: the average size of establishments in non-tradables (15) and in
investment goods/tradables (48); the employment share of the top decile of establishments
(0.63); the share of income generated by the top ﬁve percentile of earners (0.30); the annual
exit rate of establishments (0.10); and the annual real interest rate (0.05).
Target Moments US Data Model Parameter
Top 10% employment share 0.63 0.63 η = 5.30
Top 5% income share 0.30 0.29 α + θ = 0.80
Avg. scale in non-tradable sector 15 15 κS = 0.00
Avg. scale in tradable/investment goods sectors 48 46 κL = 2.00
Exit rate 0.10 0.10 γ = 0.89
Interest rate 0.05 0.05 β = 0.92
Table 2: Calibration
The identiﬁcation of these six parameters follows the basic logic given in our discussion
of the perfect-credit benchmark. We calibrate the ﬁxed costs, κS = 0.0 and κL = 2.0, to
match the average establishment size in the small-scale (non-tradables) and the large-scale
(investment goods/tradables) sectors (15 and 48, respectively). The per-period ﬁxed cost in
the large-scale sector, κL = 2.0, is tantamount to about three times the equilibrium wage in
the perfect-credit benchmark. Given the returns to scale, α+θ, we choose the tail parameter
21One alternative is to classify industries (at a more disaggregated level) into small vs. large scale sectors,
on the basis of some industry-speciﬁc scale measures. This way, we would maximize the scale diﬀerences
between these two broadly-deﬁned sectors, and hence their diﬀerences in ﬁxed costs. We choose the non-
tradable vs. tradable mapping, to be on the conservative side in model speciﬁcation, and to draw upon the
existing body of work on this topic.
22The intratemporal elasticity of 1.0 is within the range of the estimates in the literature. Ostry and
Reinhart (1991) estimate it to be 1.24 for a group of developing countries, and Mendoza (1995) reports an
elasticity of 0.74 for a group of industrialized countries.
23As is common in heterogeneous-agent models with ﬁnancial frictions, the discount rate must be jointly
calibrated with the parameters governing the stochastic income process.
20of the entrepreneurial talent distribution, η = 5.3, to match the employment share of the
largest ten percentile of establishments, 0.63. We can then infer α+θ = 0.8 from the income
share of the top ﬁve percentile of earners. Top earners are mostly entrepreneurs (both in
the US data and in the model), and α + θ controls the fraction of output going to the
entrepreneurial input. The parameter γ = 0.89 leads to an annual establishment exit rate of
ten per cent in the model. This is consistent with the job destruction rate in the US reported
by Davis et al. (1996). Finally, the model requires a discount factor of β = 0.92 to match
the annual interest rate of ﬁve per cent.


































































Fig. 3: Establishment size distributions in the data and in the model. The horizontal axis is the
number of employees (s) in log scale. For each s, one computes the fraction of establishments whose
number of employees is greater than or equal to s, and takes log of this fraction (vertical axis). As we
assume a Pareto distribution for entrepreneurial talent in each sector, the perfect-credit benchmark
yields straight lines for the small-scale sector (solid line) and the large-scale sector (dashed line).
One can construct such a line using all the establishments in our perfect-credit benchmark (inclusive
of both sectors), which is the dotted line. We do the same calculation using the US data. The
establishment size distribution for the tradable/investment goods sector (the large-scale sector) is
traced with ∗, while the circles (◦) are for the non-tradable sector (the small-scale sector).
Figure 3 shows the establishment size distribution from the calibrated perfect-credit
benchmark, and compares it with the US data. The model is able to ﬁt the tails of the em-
pirical distribution, the distance between the two within-sector distributions, and the initial
concavity in the overall (inclusive of both sectors) distribution of establishment size. The
assumption that productivities for both sectors are drawn from the same Pareto distribution
generates the identical slope for the right tails. The model cannot capture the initial con-
cavity in the distribution of establishment size within a sector, however, presumably because
we are abstracting from within-sector heterogeneity in ﬁxed costs.
214.2 Results
In this section, we quantify the eﬀect of ﬁnancial frictions on economic development. We
ﬁrst show that ﬁnancial frictions have a substantial, adverse impact on per-capita income.
In our exercises, the lower per-capita income in economies with ﬁnancial frictions is mainly
explained by their low aggregate TFP, with particularly low productivity in the large-scale
sector. These results are consistent with the empirical ﬁndings in Section 2.
We vary φ—the parameter governing the enforcement of contracts in condition (2)—to
span a range of external ﬁnance to GDP ratios observed in the data. With quintiles of
countries constructed in terms of per-capita income at PPP, external ﬁnance to GDP ratio
averages 0.1 for the bottom quintile and 2.1 for the top quintile. The equilibrium external
ﬁnance to GDP ratio is monotonically decreasing in φ in our exercises. We use 14 values of
φ ranging from 0.10 to 0.99, which span variations in external ﬁnance to GDP ratios from
0.4 to 2.4. The parameter φ itself has no immediate real-world counterpart. Hence we plot
variables of interest against the ratio of external ﬁnance to GDP implied by a given φ.







Per−Capita GDP vs. External Finance









































TFP vs. External Finance























Fig. 4: Per capita GDP at PPP (left panel) and aggregate TFP (right panel) against the ratio of
external ﬁnance to GDP (horizontal axis). Data (countries, •) and model (￿).
Aggregate Impact of Financial Frictions Figure 4 plots (using diamonds) the simu-
lated eﬀect of ﬁnancial frictions on per-capita income at PPP, and on aggregate TFP. Both
income and TFP are measured relative to our perfect-credit, US benchmark. The dots in
the ﬁgure represent data (countries), also relative to the US. In our model, the variation in
ﬁnancial frictions can bring down per-capita income to less than half of the US level. This
roughly accounts for the diﬀerence between a country like Malaysia and the US, or about
80 per cent of the US-Mexico diﬀerence. While this does not come close to the diﬀerence
22between the US and the poorest countries in sub-Saharan Africa, the magnitude is never-
theless sizable, considering that we are varying one single factor—ﬁnancial markets—across
countries. Furthermore, the factor-of-two diﬀerence in per-capita income generated by our
quantitative theory goes a long way, if one were to focus on the factor-of-ﬁve diﬀerence in
non-agricultural output per capita between the richest ﬁfth percentile of countries and the
poorest ﬁfth percentile.24
As in the data, the per-capita income diﬀerences in our model are primarily accounted
for by diﬀerences in TFP (Figure 4, right panel).25 Financial frictions can reduce aggregate
TFP by more than 40 per cent.
Impact on Sectoral Productivity Financial frictions have diﬀerential impact on the two
sectors. Note that we identify the investment goods and tradable sectors with the large-scale
sector, and the non-tradable sector with the small-scale sector. The solid lines in Figure 5
trace the eﬀect of ﬁnancial frictions on the measured TFP of the small-scale, non-tradable
sector (left panel) and the large-scale, tradable sector (right panel). While TFP declines
by up to 30 per cent in the small-scale sector, TFP in the large-scale sector declines by
more than 50 per cent with ﬁnancial frictions. This result is consistent with the empirical
observation in Section 2 that productivity diﬀerences across countries are sharpest for the
large-scale sector.
Next, we ask what are the driving forces behind these eﬀects on aggregate and sector-level
productivity. Intuitively, ﬁnancial frictions distort the allocation of productive capital among
entrepreneurs in operation. Those with binding collateral constraints will have a marginal
product of capital higher than the rental rate. In addition, ﬁnancial frictions distort the
entry and exit of entrepreneurs: Productive-but-poor entrepreneurs delay entry until they
can overcome ﬁnancing constraints, and incompetent-but-wealthy ones remain in business for
too long. Here we quantitatively analyze how ﬁnancial frictions aﬀect sectoral and aggregate
productivity by distorting the allocation of capital and the allocation of entrepreneurial
talents.
In Figure 5, we decompose the eﬀect of ﬁnancial frictions on sectoral TFP into their eﬀect
on the allocation of capital across active entrepreneurs (intensive margin, or misallocation
of capital), and their eﬀect on the allocation of entrepreneurial talents (extensive margin).
The extensive margin is further decomposed into the number of active entrepreneurs in
each sector, and into the distribution of talent among active entrepreneurs (misallocation
of talent). To quantify this decomposition, we perform three experiments on our simulated
economies. First, we reallocate capital among active entrepreneurs in each sector to equalize
24See Restuccia et al. (2008) for a decomposition of cross-country per-capita income diﬀerences into
agricultural and non-agricultural components.
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Fig. 5: Decomposing the impact of ﬁnancial frictions on sectoral TFP in the small-scale sector
(left panel) and in the large-scale sector (right panel). Solid lines are the sectoral TFP of simulated
economies with ﬁnancial frictions. TFP is normalized by its level in the perfect-credit benchmark,
and plotted against external ﬁnance to GDP ratios. Eﬃcient reallocation of capital among existing
active entrepreneurs raises the sectoral TFP (dashed-crossed lines). When distortions on selection
into entrepreneurship are undone, sectoral TFP further increases (dotted-circled lines).
the marginal product of capital across them. For this experiment, we hold ﬁxed the number
and the talent distribution of active entrepreneurs, as well as the total capital and labor
employed in each sector. The sectoral TFP after this reallocation is the dashed-crossed
lines in both panels. For the small-scale sector, almost all of the lower TFP is explained
by the misallocation of capital among active entrepreneurs. For the large-scale sector, this
intensive-margin distortion explains only half of the lower TFP.
In the second experiment, while holding ﬁxed the number of active entrepreneurs in each
sector, we select the most talented individuals into entrepreneurship. We also allocate capital
eﬃciently across the new set of active entrepreneurs.26 The resulting sectoral TFP from this
reallocation of talent and capital is the dotted-circled lines. The misallocation of talent into
entrepreneurship explains about half of the lower TFP in the large-scale sector, and about
one sixth of the lower TFP in the small-scale sector.
Finally, in addition to the eﬃcient reallocation of talent and capital above, we allow
for the number of entrepreneurs to adjust in each sector at the perfect-credit equilibrium
prices. This additional adjustment aﬀects the sectoral TFP only slightly. The dotted-circled
lines from the second experiment are already quite close to the horizontal line going through
26For each sector, we pick among the individuals that strictly prefer to be unconstrained entrepreneurs in
that sector at the distorted equilibrium prices.
24one, which represents the TFP level in the perfect-credit benchmark. This last experiment
suggests that restrictions to entry per se may not have signiﬁcant quantitative eﬀects unless
the distribution of entrants is distorted.
The following conclusions can be drawn from these sector-level exercises. Because of
their larger investment needs, establishments in the large-scale sector are more susceptible
to ﬁnancial frictions. There are more misallocation of capital and more misallocation of
entrepreneurial talent in the large-scale sector than in the small-scale sector. In particular,
the distortions on the entry/exit decisions of entrepreneurs matter vastly more for the large-
scale sector. This result suggests that modeling endogenous entry/exit of entrepreneurs is
pivotal for capturing the large impact of ﬁnancial frictions on productivity.








Relative Price vs. Per−Capita GDP




















Relative Price vs. External Finance












Fig. 6: Relative price of tradables to non-tradables (logpT/pNT, vertical axis) plotted against log
per-capita GDP (left panel) and external ﬁnance to GDP ratios (right panel), all relative to the
US. Data (countries, •) and model (￿). The dashed lines are the regression line using the data,
while the solid lines are the regression and extrapolation line using model simulations.
Relative Productivity and Relative Prices The pattern of relative productivity be-
tween the two sectors leads to the price of the large-scale sector relative to the small-scale
sector being higher in countries with underdeveloped ﬁnancial markets. The left panel of
Figure 6 uses a log-log scale to plot the relative price of tradables to non-tradables (pT/pNT)
against per-capita GDP (relative to the US).27 The diamonds represent the model simula-
tions, and the dots represent data (countries). The dashed lines are the regression lines using
the data, and the solid lines are the regression (and extrapolation) lines using model simula-
tions. Our baseline calibration explains nearly all (95 per cent) of the implied cross-country
27Note that we calibrate the two sectors of our model to match the scale diﬀerences between non-tradables
and tradables.
25elasticity between the relative price and income per capita. As pointed out in our discussion
of Figure 4, ﬁnancial frictions alone can span only about a factor-of-two variation in income
per capita, so all the diamonds are concentrated between -1 and 0. The right panel of Figure
6 uses a log-log scale to plot the relative price of tradables to non-tradables against the ratio
of external ﬁnance to GDP. Our model explains about half of the elasticity of relative prices
with respect to external ﬁnance, leaving room for other explanations of relative productivity
that are correlated with ﬁnancial frictions.
Impact on Within-Sector Distribution of Establishment Productivity and Size
In addition to their eﬀects on the relative productivity and relative prices, ﬁnancial frictions
aﬀect the within-sector distributions of establishment-level productivity and size diﬀeren-
tially across the two sectors.
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Fig. 7: Impact of ﬁnancial frictions on the within-sector distributions of establishment-level pro-
ductivity and size. Clockwise from top left, all plotted against the ratio of external ﬁnance to GDP
(horizontal axis): Average productivity (z) of active entrepreneurs in the small-scale sector (dashed
line) and in the large-scale sector (solid line), normalized by the average large-scale entrepreneurial
productivity in the perfect-credit benchmark; Coeﬃcient of variation (c.v.) for the productivity
of active entrepreneurs in each sector; Coeﬃcient of variation of the establishment size (number
of workers) in each sector; Average establishment size in the small-scale sector (dashed line, left
scale) and the ratio of average large-scale sector establishment size to average small-scale sector
establishment size (dotted line, right scale).
The top left panel of Figure 7 plots the average talent or productivity (zj) of active
entrepreneurs in the large-scale and the small-scale sectors of our simulated economies,
26against the ratio of external ﬁnance to GDP. With ﬁnancial frictions, not only entrepreneurial
talent but also an individual’s wealth determines whether she will be an entrepreneur or
not in any given period. As a result, incompetent-but-wealthy entrepreneurs remain in
business, and talented-but-poor individuals do not operate business until they can self-
ﬁnance the capital needed to operate at a proﬁtable scale. The positive slopes of the two lines
(dashed line for small-scale and solid line for large-scale) reﬂect this distorted selection into
entrepreneurship.28 Furthermore, Figure 5 showed that the misallocation of talent is more
rampant in the large-scale sector, which is conﬁrmed here. The average entrepreneurial talent
in the large-scale sector drops by more than 40 per cent in response to ﬁnancial frictions,
while its counterpart for the small-scale sector goes down by only 20 per cent.29
With more ﬁnancial frictions, an individual’s wealth becomes relatively more inﬂuential
upon their decisions of entry into and exit from entrepreneurship. As a result, individuals
with more diverse entrepreneurial talents will be operating business in any given period. The
top right panel of Figure 7 reports this. With more ﬁnancial frictions (and lower ratios of
external ﬁnance to GDP), the within-sector distribution of establishment-level productivity
(zj, j = S,L) becomes more disperse, increasing the coeﬃcient of variation.
Next, we focus on the lower panels of Figure 7 to explore how ﬁnancial frictions aﬀect the
within-sector establishment size distribution. For given output and factor prices, the size (or
the number of workers) of an establishment is determined by the entrepreneurial productivity
and the collateral constraint. Therefore, entrepreneurs with the same productivity may
operate at diﬀerent scales, as they may have diﬀerent levels of wealth (collateral). We
have already seen that ﬁnancial frictions increase the dispersion of the establishment-level
productivity (entrepreneurial talent). This is compounded with the increased dispersion of
scale for given entrepreneurial talent, and the within-sector establishment size distribution
becomes more disperse when there are more ﬁnancial frictions (Figure 7, bottom right panel).
In our model, the dispersion of the overall (inclusive of both sectors) establishment size
distribution also increases with ﬁnancial frictions. This is consistent with the conventional
wisdom of a “missing middle” in less developed economies. See Tybout (2000) for a survey.
In the bottom left panel of Figure 7, we trace how the average establishment size of the
two sectors changes in response to ﬁnancial frictions. The dotted line is the ratio of the
28Note that ﬁnancial frictions decrease the equilibrium ratio of external ﬁnance to GDP, which is on the
horizontal axis.
29Note that the average entrepreneurial talent in the large-scale sector goes up modestly while the ratio
of external ﬁnance to GDP falls from 2.4 to 2.2. This “positive” selection into entrepreneurship arises from
the fact that highly productive entrepreneurs can overcome the collateral constraint more easily than low
productivity ones. Firstly, for a given level of output and factor prices, they make more proﬁts. In addition,
our ﬁnancing limit ¯ k( ) is an increasing function of z. These forces seem to dominate with very mild degrees
of ﬁnancial frictions (high φ’s), generating the hump in the average entrepreneurial talent in the tradable
sector.
27average establishment size in the large-scale sector to the average establishment size in the
small-scale sector, ¯ lL/¯ lS (right-hand side vertical axis). The relative scale of these two sectors
increases when there are more ﬁnancial frictions. The larger scale and more ﬁnancing needs
in the sector with larger ﬁxed costs make it harder to set up an establishment there with
ﬁnancial frictions, reducing the number of these establishments relative to the small-scale
sector. At the same time, the relative output price of the large-scale sector goes up with
ﬁnancial frictions. These forces seem to dominate the relatively steeper fall in the average
entrepreneurial talent in the large-scale sector (top left panel), and push up the relative scale
of these establishments. This is a novel prediction of our model, and is further pursued in
the next section.
Of course, our model also has implications on the absolute scale of establishments in each
sector. The dashed line in the bottom left panel of Figure 7 is the average establishment size
in the small-scale sector (left-hand side vertical axis). As ﬁnancial frictions get more severe
(and the ratio of external ﬁnance to GDP falls from 2.4 to 0.4), the average establishment
size in the small-scale sector goes from 15 to 19, and ﬁnally to 10. In our model, the number
of small-scale establishments falls in response to more ﬁnancial frictions over the range where
the ratio of external ﬁnance to GDP is between 2.5 and 1.75. This reﬂects increased diﬃculty
in starting a business even in the small-scale sector, when there are more ﬁnancial frictions.
In addition, factor prices fall in response to more ﬁnancial frictions. These forces contribute
to the scale of 19 workers per establishment, which is larger than that of our perfect-credit,
US benchmark. However, with an even higher degree of ﬁnancial frictions—one comparable
to Mexico’s, for example, with the ratio of external ﬁnance to GDP close to 0.5, the scale
of establishments in the small-scale sector is absolutely smaller than in our US benchmark
(10 vs. 15). In this region, the dominating force is the low equilibrium wage, which makes
more individuals, including those who are not particularly talented, choose entrepreneurship
instead. These marginal entrepreneurs overwhelmingly choose to start businesses in the
small-scale sector, whose establishment-level technology commands less ﬁnancing needs. In
this sense, ﬁnancial frictions generate too many establishments that are too small.
Absent from the ﬁgure is the average establishment size in the large-scale sector, although
it can be easily inferred from the other two series. As ﬁnancial frictions lower the ratio of
external ﬁnance to GDP from 2.4 to 0.4, the average establishment size in the large-scale
sector goes from 60 to 115, and ﬁnally to 80. In our model, ﬁnancial frictions particularly
deter entry into the large-scale sector because of its large ﬁnancing needs. In addition, factor
prices fall in response to ﬁnancial frictions. These forces lead to an increased establishment
size in the large-scale sector. In particular, our model predicts that a country with severe
ﬁnancial frictions will have establishments in the large-scale sector that are on average bigger
than those in the US. This is another novel prediction of our model, and on the face of it, it
28seems to defy the conventional wisdom that establishments in less developed countries are on
average much smaller than those in advanced economies. However, the overall—inclusive of
both sectors—average establishment size of our model economy with ﬁnancial frictions (the
one with an external ﬁnance ratio of 0.5) is smaller than that of the perfect-credit benchmark.
This is because there are fewer of these large-scale establishments and more of the small-scale
establishments in this economy with ﬁnancial frictions than in the perfect-credit benchmark.
We address this model prediction in the next section.
4.3 A Testable Implication
Our exercises conﬁrm the intuition that ﬁnancial frictions are more harmful to the sector
with higher ﬁxed costs, larger scales, and more ﬁnancing needs (i.e. investment goods and
tradables). One novel result is the eﬀect of ﬁnancial frictions on the average establishment
size of sectors in the equilibrium. Financial frictions lead to greater disparity in establishment
size between the large-scale sector and the small-scale sector (Figure 7, bottom left panel).
As discussed above, this result stems not only from the direct eﬀect of ﬁnancial frictions on
entrepreneurial entry decisions, but also from the general equilibrium eﬀect on wage, capital
rental rates, and output prices. With ﬁnancial frictions, wages go down, and small-scale
entrepreneurship becomes more desirable because the opportunity cost—the income from
being a worker—is lower. On the other hand, reasonably-able entrepreneurs who have the
means to meet the ﬁnancing needs of large-scale production face relatively higher output
prices and lower factor prices, which lead to even larger establishments.
In the real world, many country-speciﬁc distortions that we do not consider in our model
aﬀect the absolute scale of establishments, particularly in developing countries.30 For this
reason, we ﬁrst focus on our model prediction on the relative scale of establishments across
sectors. Then we revisit our model predictions on how ﬁnancial frictions aﬀect the absolute
scale of sectors.
4.3.1 Cross-Country Analysis of Relative Scale
Evaluating this implication requires data sources for scale that have full coverage and are
comparable across countries. The available OECD SSIS is designed for comparability of
industries, but its coverage is not well documented: Our concern is that small, informal
establishments are not well accounted for in the data. Furthermore, not all countries have
complete coverage of industries, and only the US provides both establishment-level and
enterprise-level data. We have ten additional countries with comparable data: the three large
30Hsieh and Klenow (2007b) and Guner et al. (2008) highlight the importance of such distortions, for
example.
29advanced economies (France, Germany, and the UK) and the seven “less-developed” coun-
tries available (Czech Republic, Hungary, Korea, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, and Turkey).
Korea and Turkey provide establishment-level data, while the others provide enterprise-level
data.31
For both measures of scale (workers per enterprise or per establishment), we calculate the
average for the tradable and the non-tradable sectors in each country, and take the ratio of
the two. Using enterprise-level data, we ﬁnd that in each of the ﬁve less-developed countries,
the relative scale of the tradable sector (ranging from 3.4 to 4.1, with a median of 3.8) is
larger than in the US (3.1). With establishment-level data, we ﬁnd much more striking
disparities: 10.6 for Korea and 35.0 for Turkey, against 3.7 for the US.32
While available OECD data show that the relative size of tradable establish-
ments/enterprieses (to non-tradable ones) is larger in less-developed countries than in
the US, these data seem to suﬀer from coverage issues. We now turn to a case study of the
US and Mexico, using data sets with vastly superior comparability and coverage.
4.3.2 A Case Study of the US and Mexico
Data for the US and Mexico allow a more detailed analysis. We use them to revisit our model
implication on how ﬁnancial frictions aﬀect the absolute scale of establishments across sec-
tors. We use Mexico’s 1998 National Survey of Micro-Enterprises (ENAMIN) to impute
corrections that make the US and Mexican data fully comparable, even on a detailed level.
These corrections include adjustments to remove non-employers, which are included in the
Mexican Census but not for the US, and adjustments to add small-scale entrepreneurs with-
out a ﬁxed location, who are included in the US Census (though presumably unimportant)
but not for Mexico, where they play an important role. We analyze data at the four-digit
level, dropping industries that have a high level of government involvement or provision.33
The average establishment size is substantially smaller in Mexico than in the US (7 vs.
16 workers per establishment overall), particularly in non-tradables: retail, transportation,
31The data are for 2002. When not available, we use those for 2001 or 2003. Data on three additional
advanced economies (Australia, Canada, and Japan) and one additional “less-developed” country (Mexico)
lacked coverage of too many sectors of the economy. Given our focus on ﬁnancing, we drop government, as
well as industries that are extreme outliers and are substantially government-ﬁnanced: air transportation,
central banking, postal service, and rail transportation.
32We also considered classifying industries into large-scale vs. small-scale sectors. For a given industry, we
compute its average workers per enterprise in France, Germany, the UK and the US. This quantity is used
to sort industries into the large-scale sector and the small-scale sector. The results are consistent with our
ﬁndings based on tradable vs. non-tradable sectors: The relative size of enterprises/establishments in the
large-scale sector to those in the small-scale sector is bigger in the less-developed economies than in the rich
economies.
33More precisely, we drop health, education, petroleum mining and transportation, urban and inter-city
passenger rail, air transportation, gambling and casinos, and some other social service industries in which
government establishments constitute at least 50 percent of all establishments.
30and construction, for example. Comparison of non-tradables at a more detailed level is not
possible, unfortunately, since the US and Mexican classiﬁcation schemes do not correspond
at a further disaggregated level for non-tradables.
Mexico Scale vs. US Scale: Tradables
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Fig. 8: Average establishment size in a given industry in Mexico (logarithmic vertical axis) against
that in the US (logarithmic horizontal axis). 88 industries in the tradable sector.
Tradables, however, show perfect correspondence between the two countries, a goal of the
NAICS system. In the tradable sector, many industries have larger average establishment
size in Mexico than in the US (those lying above the 45-degree line in Figure 8), although on
average Mexican tradables establishments are smaller than those in the US. Figure 8 plots
the average establishment size (workers per establishment) of a given industry in Mexico
(logarithmic vertical axis) against that in the US (logarithmic horizontal axis) for 88 four-
digit industries in the tradable sector. The data show a slope that is clearly steeper than
the 45-degree line. That is, within the tradable sector, the industries that are of a large
scale in the US are even larger in Mexico, while those that are small scale in the US are
even smaller in Mexico. The regression coeﬃcient is 1.27 with a standard error of 0.14.
This ﬁnding is consistent with our simulation results on absolute scale of establishments. In
addition, the fact that, at the disaggregated industry level, Mexico has wider variation of
scale than the US is consistent with the model’s prediction of a higher coeﬃcient of variation
of establishment size for ﬁnancially less developed countries (Figure 7, bottom right panel).
Testing this prediction, however, would require more detailed establishment-level data.
To summarize, one of our model predictions in Section 4.2 is that, in an economy with
31ﬁnancial frictions, the large-scale sector has an even larger average establishment size, and
the small-scale sector has an even smaller average establishment size, when compared to the
perfect-credit benchmark. This implication on absolute scale in the tradable vs. non-tradable
context is rejected: The tradables establishments in Mexico are on average smaller than
those in the US. However, at a more disaggregated level, using comparable establishment-
level data, we have shown that large-scale industries tend to have an even larger average
establishment size in Mexico than in the US, while small-scale industries have an even smaller
average establishment size in Mexico than in the US. This ﬁnding, hitherto undocumented
in the literature, renders some support to our model implication on absolute scale across
sectors. Another conclusion we draw from this case study is that our mechanism, in which
scale diﬀerence induces diﬀerential impact of ﬁnancial frictions across sectors, will also work
at a more disaggregated level, not just for the tradable vs. non-tradable dichotomy.
4.4 Robustness
We brieﬂy discuss the robustness of our results to alternative model speciﬁcations. We
ﬁrst consider other ways of generating scale diﬀerences between the two sectors. We have
constructed numerical examples for a version of our model where the sectoral scale diﬀerence
is driven by one-time setup costs, rather than by per-period ﬁxed costs.34 While these
numerical examples were not precisely-calibrated exercises, we found that ﬁnancial frictions
have an even larger impact on aggregate and sectoral productivity, reﬂecting the stronger
non-convexity that (front-loaded) setup costs impose. We chose our ﬁxed-cost speciﬁcation
to avoid the risk of exaggerating the impact of ﬁnancial frictions, especially when there are
no reliable data on setup costs.35
We have also considered the possibility that the sectoral scale diﬀerence hinges on the
establishment-level span of control. In particular, we set αj and θj, j = S,L, such that
αS + θS < αL + θL, while the ratio αj/θj is the same for j = S,L. The latter assumption
reﬂects the empirical facts on factor shares reported in Table 1. In calibrated exercises
with span-of-control diﬀerences and no ﬁxed cost in either sector, we ﬁnd that the eﬀects
of ﬁnancial frictions are broadly consistent with our ﬁndings in Section 4.2, although not as
34In the recursive formulation of this speciﬁcation, we need to carry an additional state variable indicating
whether in the previous period an individual was a worker, an entrepreneur in the S sector, or an entrepreneur
in the L sector. More important, we allow for between-periods borrowing, i.e., a < 0. We assume that debt
contracts are contingent on idea shocks such that the debt of those entrepreneurs hit with an idea shock
(with probability 1 − γ) at the end of a period is forgiven. The lower bound on asset a is deﬁned to be
the most generous debt limit that is enforceable when the borrower is not hit with an idea shock. The
zero-proﬁt condition of the ﬁnancial intermediary will determine the spread between the deposit and the
borrowing rates.
35See, for example, Paulson and Townsend (2004) and McKenzie and Woodruﬀ (2006) for discussions on
setup and ﬁxed costs for small establishments in developing countries. Sutton (1991) explains the diﬃculties
of estimating setup costs using data from oligopolistic industries in developed countries.
32large in magnitude. One important distinction is the implication on how relative scale of
the two sectors responds to ﬁnancial frictions. With span-of-control diﬀerences, the relative
scale of the two sectors (L to S) decreases with ﬁnancial frictions. Recall that our model
with ﬁxed cost diﬀerences predicts the opposite, consistent with our empirical ﬁndings in
Section 4.3. It is mainly for this reason that we chose the ﬁxed-cost model for our analysis.
Finally, we have also tried an alternative speciﬁcation for the collateral constraint: a
capital rental limit that does not depend on the entrepreneurs’ talent z. More speciﬁcally,
the sum of the capital rental and the ﬁxed cost could not exceed λa, where λ is a parameter
governing the degree of ﬁnancial frictions, and a is the ﬁnancial wealth of an entrepreneur
at the beginning of a period. Note that λ = 1 corresponds to ﬁnancial autarky, and that
λ → +∞ to the perfect-credit benchmark. In calibrated exercises with this simpler collateral
constraint, the results are very similar to our results in Section 4.2, both qualitatively and
quantitatively. One nice feature of this speciﬁcation is that the absolute scale (average
workers per establishment) of small-scale sector establishments are monotonically decreasing
in the degree of ﬁnancial frictions, unlike the hump in the bottom left panel of Figure 7. We
nevertheless decided to go with a more general speciﬁcation where collateral constraints are
determined by both entrepreneurs’ ﬁnancial wealth and talent.
5 Concluding Remarks
We have developed a quantitative theory linking countries’ level of ﬁnancial development
to their per-capita GDP, aggregate TFP, relative productivity and prices across sectors.
Financial frictions distort the allocation of capital and entrepreneurial talents, and are found
to have sizable eﬀects on a country’s output per worker and aggregate productivity. The
sectors characterized by large ﬁxed costs at the establishment level operate most eﬃciently
at larger scales, and hence have bigger ﬁnancing needs. For this reason, they are more
vulnerable to ﬁnancial frictions than small-scale sectors. We have shown that this mechanism
is quantitatively important, explaining half of the observed relationship between ﬁnancial
development and relative productivity of sectors in the data. We have also shown that our
mechanism is also consistent with the larger diﬀerences in average establishment sizes across
sectors observed in ﬁnancially less developed countries.
Our analysis shows how micro-level (ﬁrm or establishment) technological diﬀerences
across sectors help us better understand macroeconomic issues such as relative productivity
and relative prices. In this context, we view the study of other micro-level distortions—e.g.
size-dependent policies of Guner et al. (2008), and entry barriers of Djankov et al. (2002)—
and their interaction with ﬁnancial frictions as promising avenues for future research.
33Proof of Proposition 1 The rental of capital k in sector j is enforceable iﬀ:
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where ˜ vj (k;a,z) is the value of a non-defaulting entrepreneur with wealth a and ability z
that operates in sector j with rented capital k:
˜ vj (k;a,z) = max
c,a′ {u(c) + β [γv (a′,z) + (1 − γ)Ez′v (a′,z′)]}
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which is equivalent to:
(1 + r)(a − pjκj) ≥ (1 − φ + r + φδ)k − φmax
l
{pjzjf (k,l) − wl}.
As long as limk→0fk (k,l) = ∞ and limk→∞ fk (k,l) = 0, there exists a unique function
¯ kj (a,zj;φ) deﬁned implicitly by:
(1 + r)(a − pjκj) = (1 − φ + r + φδ)¯ k










It is straightforward to see that ¯ kj (a,zj;φ) is strictly increasing in a, zj, and φ.
Proof of Proposition 2 In an economy with perfect credit markets, selection of individ-
uals into entrepreneurship and sectors is determined by their entrepreneurial talents and
relative prices. In particular, there exist two threshold ideas ˆ zj, j = S,L, and a function
ˆ zj (z−j), (j,−j) = (S,L),(L,S), dividing the space of entrepreneurial ideas (zS,zL) into
workers and entrepreneurs in the S and L sectors. These thresholds are deﬁned by the







































(1 − α − θ) − p−jκ−j. (8)
Integrating over individual output of entrepreneurs in sector j net of ﬁxed costs, we obtain








θ µ(dz) − κjN
  ∞
ˆ zj
  ˆ z−j(zj)
0
µ(dz). (9)
















N , which follow from the ﬁrst order conditions

























































j µ(dz) − κjN
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ˆ zj























Assuming µ(dz) = η2 (zSzL)
−(η+1) and that entrepreneurs are a small fractions of the
population (i.e., ˆ zj is large for j = S,L), we obtain
Zj =
   ∞
ˆ zj


















  ˆ z−j(zj)
0







































































Proof of Proposition 3 From the ﬁrst order conditions of an entrepreneur of productivity


























































, l ≥ l(ˆ zS).












N (1 − µ(ˆ zj))
. (12)




j = w, (13)
(1 − α − θ)pjN−α−θZjKα
j Lθ
j = pjκj (1 − µ(ˆ zj)) + wµ(ˆ zj). (14)
Taking the ratio of these two conditions, we obtain:
1 − α − θ
θ
Lj
N (1 − µ(ˆ zj))





1 − µ(ˆ zj)
. (15)
































1 − µ(ˆ zj)
 
η (1 − α − θ) − 1
η (1 − α − θ)
. (17)








Aghion, P. and P. Bolton (1997): “A Theory of Trickle-Down Growth and Develop-
ment,” Review of Economic Studies, 64, 151–172.
Amaral, P. and E. Quintin (2005): “Financial Intermediation and Economic Develop-
ment: A Quantitative Assessment,” Manuscript, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.
Balassa, B. (1964): “The Purchasing Power Parity Doctrine: A Reappraisal,” Journal of
Political Economy, 72, 584–596.
Banerjee, A. V. and E. Duflo (2005): “Growth Theory through the Lens of Develop-
ment Economics,” in Handbook of Economic Growth, ed. by P. Aghion and S. N. Durlauf,
Amsterdam: Elsevier, vol. 1A, 473–552.
Banerjee, A. V. and A. F. Newman (1993): “Occupational Choice and the Process of
Development,” Journal of Political Economy, 101, 274–298.
Beck, T. (2002): “Financial Development and International Trade: Is There a Link,” World
Bank Economic Review, 57, 107–131.
Beck, T., A. Demirg¨ uc ¸-Kunt, L. Laeven, and R. Levine (2008): “Finance, Firm
Size, and Growth,” Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 40, 1327–1554.
Beck, T., A. Demirg¨ uc ¸-Kunt, and R. Levine (2000): “A New Database on the
Structure and Development of the Financial Sector,” World Bank Economic Review, 14,
597–605.
Buera, F. J. and J. P. Kaboski (2008): “The Rise of the Service Economy,” Manuscript,
UCLA.
Buera, F. J. and Y. Shin (2008): “Financial Frictions and the Persistence of History: A
Quantitative Exploration,” Manuscript, Washington University in St. Louis.
Caselli, F. and N. Gennaioli (2005): “Dynastic Management,” Manuscript, London
School of Economics.
Chari, V. V., P. J. Kehoe, and E. R. McGrattan (1997): “The Poverty of Nations:
A Quantitative Investigation,” Staﬀ Report 204, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
Davis, S. J., J. C. Haltiwanger, R. Jarmin, and J. Miranda (2006): “Volatility and
Dispersion in Business Growth Rates: Publicly Traded versus Privately Held Firms,” in
NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2006, ed. by M. Gertler and K. Rogoﬀ, Cambridge, MA:
MIT Press, 107–156.
Davis, S. J., J. C. Haltiwanger, and S. Schuh (1996): Job Creation and Destruction,
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Djankov, S., R. La Prota, F. Lopez-de Silanes, and A. Shleifer (2002): “The
Regulation of Entry,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117, 1–37.
Eaton, J. and S. Kortum (2001): “Technology, Trade, and Growth: A Uniﬁed Frame-
work,” European Economic Review, 45, 742–755.
37Erosa, A. and A. Hidalgo Cabrillana (2008): “On Finance as a Theory of TFP,
Cross-Industry Productivity Diﬀerences, and Economic Rents,” International Economic
Review, 49, 437–473.
Gin´ e, X. and R. M. Townsend (2004): “Evaluation of Financial Liberalization: A Gen-
eral Equilibrium Model with Constrained Occupation Choice,” Journal of Development
Economics, 74, 269–307.
Guner, N., G. Ventura, and Y. Xu (2008): “Macroeconomic Implications of Size-
Dependent Policies,” Review of Economic Dynamics, 11, 721–744.
Hall, R. E. and C. I. Jones (1999): “Why Do Some Countries Produce So Much More
Output per Worker than Others?” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114, 83–116.
Herrendorf, B. and A. Valentinyi (2006): “Which Sectors Make the Poor Countries
so Unproductive,” Manuscript, Arizona State University.
Hsieh, C.-T. and P. Klenow (2007a): “Misallocation and Manufacturing TFP in China
and India,” Manuscript, Stanford University.
——— (2007b): “Relative Prices and Relative Prosperity,” American Economic Review, 97,
562–585.
Jeong, H. and R. M. Townsend (2007): “Sources of TFP Growth: Occupational Choice
and Financial Deepening,” Economic Theory, 32, 197–221.
Jones, C. I. (1994): “Economic Growth and the Relative Price of Capital,” Journal of
Monetary Economics, 34, 359–382.
King, R. G. and R. Levine (1993a): “Finance and Growth: Schumpeter Might Be Right,”
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 108, 717–737.
——— (1993b): “Finance, Entrepreneurship and Growth: Theory and Evidence,” Journal
of Monetary Economics, 32, 513–542.
Klenow, P. J. and A. Rodr´ ıguez-Clare (1997): “The Neoclassical Revival in Growth
Economics: Has it Gone Too Far?” in Macroeconomics Annual 1997, ed. by B. S. Bernanke
and J. J. Rotemberg, Cambridge: MIT Press, 73–102.
Kletzer, K. and P. Bardhan (1987): “Credit Markets and Patterns of International
Trade,” Journal of Development Economics, 27, 57–70.
La Porta, R., F. Lopez de Silanes, A. Shleifer, and R. W. Vishny (1998): “Law
and Finance,” Journal of Political Economy, 106, 1113–1155.
Lloyd-Ellis, H. and D. Bernhardt (2000): “Enterprise, Inequality and Economic
Development,” Review of Economic Studies, 67, 147–168.
Lucas, Jr., R. E. (1978): “On the Size Distribution of Business Firms,” Bell Journal of
Economics, 9, 508–523.
Manova, K. (2008a): “Credit Constraints, Equity Market Liberalizations and International
Trade,” Journal of International Economics, 76, 33–47.
38——— (2008b): “Credit Constraints, Heterogeneous Firms, and International Trade,”
Manuscript, Stanford University.
Matsuyama, K. (2005): “Credit Market Imperfections and Patterns of International Trade
and Capital Flows,” Journal of the European Economic Association, 3, 714–723.
McKenzie, D. J. and C. M. Woodruff (2006): “Do Entry Costs Provide an Empirical
Basis for Poverty Traps? Evidence from Mexican Microenterprises,” Development and
Cultural Change, 55, 3–42.
Mendoza, E. (1995): “The Terms of Trade, the Real Exchange Rate, and Economic
Fluctuations,” International Economic Review, 36, 101–137.
Ostry, J. and C. Reinhart (1991): “Private Saving and Terms of Trade Shocks: Evidence
from Developing Countries,” Manuscript, International Monetary Fund.
Paulson, A. L. and R. M. Townsend (2004): “Entrepreneurship and Financial Con-
straints in Thailand,” Journal of Corporate Finance, 10, 229–262.
Piketty, T. (1997): “The Dynamics of the Wealth Distribution and the Interest Rate with
Credit Rationing,” Review of Economic Studies, 64, 173–189.
Rajan, R. G. and L. Zingales (1998): “Financial Dependence and Growth,” American
Economic Review, 88, 559–586.
Restuccia, D. and R. Rogerson (2008): “Policy Distortions and Aggregate Productivity
with Heterogeneous Establishments,” Review of Economic Dynamics, 11, 707–720.
Restuccia, D., D. T. Yang, and X. Zhu (2008): “Agriculture and Aggregate Pro-
ductivity: A Quantitative Cross-Country Analysis,” Journal of Monetary Economics, 55,
234–250.
Rossi-Hansberg, E. and M. L. J. Wright (2007): “Establishment Size Dynamics in
the Aggregate Economy,” American Economic Review, 97, 1639–1666.
Samuelson, P. A. (1964): “Theoretical Notes on Trade Problems,” Review of Economics
and Statistics, 46, 145–154.
Sutton, J. (1991): Sunk Costs and Market Structure, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Townsend, R. M. (2006): “The Thai Economy: Growth, Inequality, Poverty and the
Evaluation of Financial Systems,” Manuscript, University of Chicago.
Tybout, J. R. (2000): “Manufacturing Frims in Developing Countries: How Well Do They
Do, and Why?” Journal of Economic Literature, 38, 11–44.
Valentinyi, A. and B. Herrendorf (2008): “Measuring Factor Income Shares at the
Sector Level,” Review of Economic Dynamics, 11, 820–835.
Wynne, J. (2005): “Wealth as a Determinant of Comparative Advantage,” American
Economic Review, 95, 226–254.
39